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Flood Disasters and Political Culture at the German 
North Sea Coast: A Long-term Historical Perspective 
Franz Mauelshagen ∗ 
Abstract: »Sturmfluten und politische Kultur an der deut-
schen Nordseeküste in historischer Perspektive«. Taking the 
case of the German North Sea coast, this paper seeks to in-
vestigate the impacts of disaster on political culture in a 
long-term perspective. German North Sea regions offer a 
good example for strategies of coping that became ‘cultural’ 
through permanency. The German North Sea coast will be 
described as a “region of risk” (Kenneth Hewitt) that has 
had its own risk technology for almost a millennium. Dikes 
and drainage systems have shaped a cultural landscape of 
protection against the dangers of the sea. It is a landscape of 
coping. By imposing demands of upkeep and reconstruction 
dikes have strongly influenced the daily life and political 
culture of North Sea communities. Dike law will be inter-
preted as the most obvious expression of a “hydrographic 
society” (Simon Schama) that has emerged from coopera-
tion, communal organization, and conflict. 
 
Natural hazards, disaster and their impacts on societies is a field of research 
that has been reshaped over the last decade (GROH et al. 2003, p. 13-4; 
KEMPE/ ROHR 2003, p. 123; ALEXANDER 1997). Today, disasters are no 
longer regarded as purely physical or ‘natural’ incidents, even when clearly 
triggered by natural extreme events (earthquakes, tsunamis, windstorms or high 
tides etc.), and they are no longer regarded as occurrences to which there is but 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Franz Mauelshagen, Historisches Seminar, Karl Schmid-
Str. 4, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland; e-mail: F.Mauelshagen@access.unizh.ch. 
 This paper is an abbreviated version of Mauelshagen 2008, complemented by some reflec-
tions in the last section, which are not contained in the longer version. I presented the paper 
at the 20th International Congress of Historical Sciences (CISH) in Sydney in 2005 in a 
panel on Natural Disasters and How They Have Been Dealt With, chaired by Christian Pfis-
ter (Berne). Other contributors were Greg Bankoff (Hull), Georgina Endfield (Nottingham) 
and Andrea Janku (London). Dieter Schott (Darmstadt) made a number of useful sugges-
tions in his comments. A new introduction has been added for publication in the present 
volume of HSR. 
 134
a technological response. In recent debates sociologists, anthropologists, geog-
raphers, and historians have defined disasters as systemic events, catalysts of 
social development (KREPS 1998), initiators of collective learning processes 
(POLIWODA 2007), breakdown of cultural protection (CARR 1932; 
DOMBROWSKY 1998), or as falsification of human knowledge and technol-
ogy that seeks control over the natural environmental (VOSS 2006, p. 16-7). 
Despite such differences in detail research in what has become an interdiscipli-
nary field of investigation agree in choosing holistic concepts to start from. In 
this, the distinction between nature and culture (or alternatively the social) 
plays a central part. “Disasters occur at the intersection of nature and culture 
and illustrate, often dramatically, the mutuality of each in the constitution of 
the other.” (OLIVER-SMITH 2002, p. 24) Alluding to the astrological etymol-
ogy of the term ‘disaster’ (also French désastre or Italian disastro, meaning 
“bad star”) the American historian Alan Taylor speaks of “conjunctions be-
tween the social and the natural” (TAYLOR 1999, p. 147). The awareness 
about the “multidimensionality of disaster” (OLIVER-SMITH 2002, p. 25) 
relocates disastrous events within their social and cultural contexts. They are 
embedded into the economic and socio-cultural order as well as into the politi-
cal structures of the societies in which they occur. Only recently historians 
have picked up the concept of vulnerability to describe and assess the relevant 
factors involved. 
While the social and cultural ‘construction’ of disaster has been given much 
attention over the last years, the impact of disasters on the construction of so-
cieties and cultures has rarely been adequately described (BANKOFF 2008). 
Greg Bankoffs book on the Philippines is one among few exceptions 
(BANKOFF 2003; TORRENCE/ GRATTAN 2002). In Europe most historical 
research has been dedicated to single outstanding events like the Villach earth-
quake in 1348 (BORST 1981; ROHR 2003) or the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 
(BREIDERT 1994; LÖFFLER 1999). Many case studies have applied ap-
proaches adopted from ‘new cultural history’ or historical anthropology that 
understand disaster as a mirror of culture rather than an agent of cultural 
change (JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN/ LEHMANN 2003, p. 10; ALLEMEYER 
2006). Yet, organizational achievements like disaster management and preven-
tion, civil protection, or the emergence of insurance companies are often cul-
turally specific, and they may be regarded as sustainable results of historical 
experience. Such experience is—and was—never gained from strictly single 
events but from a series of occurrences discerned as similar or repetitive. All 
strategies of coping—as soon, at least, as they reach the level of future preven-
tion—are based on the expectation of repetition drawn from the experience of 
repeated disasters. Indeed, ‘repetition’ is likely to become a key term of histori-
cal research on disasters. It is the link between the past and the future, or—to 
be more precise—between past experiences and models of the future in society. 
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Prevention and management, like any kind of precaution, are built on the future 
of the past. This is why history matters. 
From these preceding remarks the modelling of the following case study 
may be understood. Raising the question of sustainable impacts of disaster on 
culture, it appears plausible to apply a long-term approach that is focused on 
“regions of risk” (HEWITT 1997) characterised by frequently recurring natural 
hazards of similar type. The North Sea coast has been such a region for a long 
time. Within the framework of this paper I will focus on the German parts of 
this landscape and highlight the relationship between disastrous floods and 
political culture. Dike law and the distribution of dike property will provide a 
framework to sketch political order and assess the importance of disaster for 
change. I will start with a historical survey of major storm tides before dealing 
with dike law and discussing the process of centralization.  
A Survey of North Sea Floods 
For centuries, the North Sea coast has been a region in which storm tides and 
the need for protection have shaped the lives of communities. “There has 
hardly been a generation that did not experience heavy storm tides with dike 
breaches and flooding.” (JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN 2003, p. 101 [translation 
by the author]; cf. WOEBCKEN 1924; DE KRAKER 2000) The flood of 1362 
has to be mentioned here, known in the history books as “Marcellus flood” or 
“grote Mandränke” (the “great man’s drowning”), that caused many casualties 
and vast losses in land. Ancient chronicles give the number of 100,000 victims 
which is definitely too high (JANKRIFT 2003, p. 43-45). The most severe 
disasters of later centuries were caused by the “Allhallows Flood” in 1570, “St 
Burchard’s Flood” on 11 October 1634—also known as “Nordstrand Flood” 
and “Second Man’s Drowning” (PANTEN et al. 1984; HINRICHS et al. 
1985)—, the “Christmas Flood” of 1717 (JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN 1992), the 
floods on 3/4 February 1825, on 1 February 1953 and on 16/17 February 1962 
in the twentieth century (SCHOTT 2002). Less disastrous storm tides, like 
those in 1643/44 and 1675, also induced dike breaches, cost human beings’ and 
animals’ lives, and ravaged farms. Water reached the highest peak levels 
probably in 1570—a flood that historians have been paying comparatively 
sparse attention to. 
Vast losses of land were characteristic of fourteenth century flood disasters, 
which is less true for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It seems likely that 
the coincidence of the 1362 flood with the first series of plague epidemics in 
Europe (since 1348) caused a lack of manpower that would have been needed 
for repair work and the construction of new protections. Damage and losses of 
dikes lead the vulnerability of North Sea coast communities to increase for 
decades, as is at least plausible from a series of floods that followed in the 
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1380s and 1390s (1380, 1387, 1381 and 1395). Chronicles reported these 
storms to have caused great damage despite the fact that all of them had oc-
curred in May or June. Under normal conditions, harmful storm tides can be 
expected to happen during the autumn and winter months (October and Febru-
ary) almost without exception. It seems probable that in the aftermath of 1362 
even weaker storms lead to corrosive flooding. In the fifteenth century a new 
period of dike construction and land reclamation was entered (PETERSEN/ 
ROHDE 1991, p. 44f.). 
In the second half of the seventeenth century, a situation similar to that after 
1362 occurred. Heavy floods in 1625 and 1634 had weakened the shore line 
when another series of painful storm tides followed (1639, 1642 and 1643/44). 
All these floods happened to take place during the Thirty Years War, probably 
the one catastrophe in pre-twentieth century German history which had the 
most long-lasting impacts on population, economy, cultural memory, and the 
political structures of Germany before the two world wars of the twentieth 
century. When northern Germany had become the main theatre of war in the 
1620s, the population endured quartering from imperial and Danish troops and 
carried the burden of contributions that was to be prolonged by the Swedes 
until the end of and even beyond the war. Contributions constituted the finan-
cial basis of warfare and were paid prevailingly in the ‘currency’ of natural 
produce and lodging, when troops befell the region, thus increasing the vulner-
ability of North Sea communities to disease and the forces of nature. After the 
flood of 1643 people from the region of Kehdingen petitioned to be relieved 
from the war taxes, that contributions amounted to be (FISCHER 2003, p. 72). 
Salted grounds were expected to threaten winter and summer seeds for years, 
leaving no surplus. The strains of war also had their effects on dike renewal. 
The logic of damage leading to further damage was on its fatal course. 
“Hydrographic Society” and Dike Law 
Natural hazard has shaped the life of individuals and communities at the North 
Sea. Relating to the Netherlands, Simon Schama has coined the term of a “hy-
drographic society” (SCHAMA 1987), which is also suitable to describe living 
conditions at the German North Sea coast (FISCHER 2003, p. 6). By definition, 
hydrographic societies are shaped by a permanent demand to cope with the 
element of water. North Sea culture relies on dikes and drainage systems—
visible marks in a cultural landscape for which protection against flooding has 
always been the prerequisite for settlement, cultivation, and land reclamation. 
At the same time the significance of dike and sluice construction reaches be-
yond purely technical effort into the realms of politics and the social. In the 
course of history they have shaped a basis for social order and cohabitation.  
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For a long time, North Sea societies have been “risk societies”—a term that 
should not be reserved to characterize modernity (BECK 1992). The settlers of 
late Antiquity and the Middle Ages as well as later immigrants into the region 
developed strategies of coping with, rather than avoiding, the dangers of the 
North Sea. They were attracted by a bunch of incentives that were expected to 
pay out for inconveniences, most basically: land and freedom. The soils con-
sisted of geologically young and unconsumed sea sediments and promised 
good yields for cultivation. Beside traditional agriculture and cattle breeding, 
specific economic branches like exploitation of salt peat stacking grounds de-
veloped. Political advantages must be added, as the influence of sovereigns (the 
leading princes on higher regional levels) and the church was comparatively 
weak. Self-government was prevalent in dike regions. Particularly after damag-
ing floods the central powers were interested in creating additional incidents by 
offering privileges to new settlers or entrepreneurs (KÜHN 1992, p. 26). 
Long before the dawn of modernity, the risk culture at the North Sea had its 
own technology. According to archaeological research the oldest dikes can be 
dated as far back as to the eleventh century (KÜHN 1992). The history of dike 
construction, which has been reconstructed in vast detail, but can only be 
roughly outlined here, has two closely connected aspects, a technical and a 
social one. 
Storm tides that destroyed dike lines and, time and again, forced people to 
give up new ground and settlements have played a catalyst function in techno-
logical development. Like the reconstruction of cities after big fires, the re-
newal of dike lines posed the challenge of planning appropriate to improve 
protection compared with the state before disaster. Still recently the develop-
ment of dike construction has been depicted as a history of progress, character-
ized by increasing technical skills and scientific knowledge in a process of 
successful and progressive learning (FISCHER 2003, p. 45). Dikes were con-
stantly raised, protection constantly improved. Regressive numbers of victims 
since the nineteenth century strengthen such views.  
Nevertheless, like in so many other fields within the history of science and 
technology, the story of linear progress must be put into perspective. The opin-
ion that medieval dikes offered little safety because their seaside slopes were 
too steep has been refuted by archaeological discoveries and, thus, proved to 
have been a myth invented by eighteenth-century treatises on dike technology 
(KÜHN 1992). More important than corrections of details is a new understand-
ing of what concretely is behind processes that are (too) often described as 
purely technical or scientific. Nowadays, sociologists and social historians 
consider processes of social differentiation in the course of which groups of 
technical and scientific experts emerged—not mainly as a result of developing 
technical and scientific knowledge, but of complex power struggles within 
society. From a certain point in history onwards the knowledge and skills of 
dike construction as well as the groups that took possession of them lost touch 
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with—or, to say the least, were disembedded from—the community of North 
Sea denizens.  
Undoubtedly, technical innovation has contributed considerably to the 
emergence of expert groups. In the literature on dike construction one such 
invention is frequently mentioned (e.g. FISCHER 2003, p. 51): In 1610 the 
Dutch engineer Johann Claussen Rollwagen came first to make use of wheel-
barrows instead of much more expensive horses when working on dikes in 
Eiderstedt. This proved a major step towards wage work in the field of dike 
construction. By cheapening and accelerating working processes, entrepreneurs 
like Rollwagen strengthened their position towards land owners, who often 
claimed the rights of dike building to be theirs alone. Employed by central 
political powers they worked as tools to grab influence, especially when severe 
floods had weakened local communities. 
I am already involved with the social aspect of dike construction that will 
further illuminate these contexts. Installing dikes that enclose wide coastal 
districts requires proper organization and material cost. They can only offer 
protection if the dike lines are well coordinated. Leading beyond technical 
skills, planning and cooperation are essential and must be performed in com-
munity. Single peasants, or landowners, and parishes organized themselves in 
higher social amalgamations. In Northern Frisia such amalgamations came into 
being as early as the tenth century (PETERSEN/ ROHDE 1991, p. 147). They 
can be described as risk communities that made protection become a matter of 
self-government and, consequentially, of ‘law and order’. The political culture 
in German North Sea regions, as well as law, was shaped by natural hazard.  
Dike law, as indeed any lawful regulations that were invented for the pur-
pose of coastal protection, has put the basic rules of a risk society into words. 
The need for regulation refers to conflict rather than harmonious cohabitation 
(ALLEMEYER 2006, part II). Many rules became ‘cultural’ even in a sense 
that they found their way into everyday life and people’s conscience. Law may 
shape identity and, therefore, be read as an expression of cultural identity. But 
it is certainly not the result of a community whose members unconditionally 
subordinated private to common interests. The definition of what interests are 
regarded as common and have to be pushed through against private profit is, by 
itself, a complex historical process of negotiation within social communities 
and between them.  
Dike law was passed on orally almost throughout the Middle Ages. First 
signs of codification can be discovered in Eike von Repgow’s Sachsenspiegel 
(around 1230). With reference to river dikes it mentions the rule that any vil-
lager that proved unable to contribute to repairing broken dikes would lose his 
land (KÜHN 1992, p. 83). “No land without dike, and no dike without land” 
was customary law. Unwritten for centuries, it was still effective when dike law 
became codified. It was also contained in the so called “spade land law” 
(Spadelandrecht) or “law of the spade” (Recht des Spaten) according to which 
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the ground that had been “gained with the spade” had to be defended by dikes 
built with spades. In dike law the spade became a symbol for the connection 
between property and dike construction. Those landowners that proved unable 
or unwilling to fulfil the demands for safety imposed by the community would 
lose their land. In such cases a supervisor, called Deichgräfe, that was to be 
appointed by parishes or dike associations, would stamp a spade into the dike 
section of the respective landowner. At some places landowners could also 
resign by doing the same thing, a common practice codified in the “Royal Dike 
Orders” of 1634: anyone to pull out the spade again would claim to take the 
land (GIERKE 1901/1917, vol. 1, p. 243).  
Codification of dike law began in the fifteenth century. The so called Sie-
benhardenbeliebung of 1426 is the earliest written record of dike law that has 
come down to us (KÜHN 1992, p. 83; PAPPENHEIM 1926). It included the 
appointment of dike judges and regulations on “dike peace” (Deichfrieden) that 
excluded feuds for times when dikes had to be worked on. Spade land law 
became codified during the middle of the sixteenth century. Only few decades 
later some regulations introduced modifications or alternatives to a complete 
loss of land: landowners that were unable to fulfil their duties wouldn’t imme-
diately lose their property but had to pay a fine (e.g. “Eiderstedter Dike Orders” 
of 1595, cf. GIERKE 1901/1917 vol. 1, p. 45) from which dike construction 
entrepreneurs were paid to carry out the necessary repair work.  
It would be worth comparing the German North Sea Coast region with the 
hydrographic culture of the Netherlands. As Simon Schama has shown dike 
culture and the wars of independence from Spanish dominance have developed 
simultaneously during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shaping 
what has been called the Dutch national identity. In this respect, the situation in 
Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony was quite different. Though ‘dike cul-
ture’ has shaped regional identity in these parts of Germany, nothing like a 
German identity emerged from it. The religious background of conflict in the 
Thirty Years War makes it even impossible to say that Danish or Swedish 
governments were experienced as occupants—like the Spanish were in the 
Netherlands—so that people sought to get rid of them as soon as possible. 
Regional identity was defended against any influence taken by central powers, 
whether they were Danish, Swedish, Prussian or ‘German’. 
Disaster and the Emergence of Central Political Powers 
In the early modern period, dike law was announced from the pulpit to gain 
publicity. Thus, it takes the same rank as city law did in the cities. This is con-
firmed by the fact that dike officials would also hold privileges of lower juris-
diction, as it reveals the comprehensive importance of dike law in the hydro-
graphic society of the North Sea coast. Furthermore, it was consequential as 
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dike law included regulations on the punishment of dike offenders that could 
even be sentenced to death. The development of dike law also reflects changes 
in supervision that can be read as changes of balance between regional self-
administration and central powers that tried to increase their influence. Codifi-
cation itself can be understood as a step towards centralization. First written 
evidence for the office of a dike supervisor (Deichgräfe) can be found in 1438 
(Spadelandbrief for the Wilstermarsch). Peasants would elect members of a 
jury to participate in dike examinations that were to be carried out on fixed 
dates. They also had responsibilities towards the sovereigns of the country. 
Around 1600 the office of Deichgräfe had become common and increasingly 
occupied by supraregional officials. The number of supervisors with a profes-
sional background in dike construction increased. In 1609, for example, the 
earlier mentioned Johann Claussen Rollwagen was appointed “dike supervisor 
general (Generaldeichgraf) of northern coastal landscapes” by the duke of 
Gottorf, Johann Adolf (KÜHN 1992, p. 90). Processes of centralization can 
also be observed under Swedish and Danish governments in the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries in Frisia and Lower Saxony. The Swedes intro-
duced the first “General Dike Orders” in 1692 after decades of gaining influ-
ence on local self-administration. In some regions, such as Kehdingen, resis-
tance against centralization proved to be quite stubborn. The Swedes succeeded 
not least because a series of floods in the 1650s and 1660s weakened local 
positions considerably (FISCHER 2003, p. 78-82). Again, in the late eighteenth 
century, severe storm tides inspired centralization and reform, demanded by 
people such as Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1736/38-1807) who was a philosopher 
and administrative official in Frisia under Danish government (PETERSEN/ 
ROHDE 1991, p. 149). In 1800 governmental dike inspectors entered the stage, 
and in 1803 the “General Dike Regulations” (Allgemeines Deich=Reglemet) 
were published, later taken over by the Prussians who introduced the “Prussian 
Law on Dikes in Schleswig-Holstein” in 1848.  
Dike properties, at large extent, still remained in private hands, though over 
the centuries central powers had become land as well as dike owners in some 
parts of the region. Private owners strove to strengthen their position by getting 
organized in dike associations that would help them keep up with the increas-
ing financial demands imposed by the technical progress of dike construction. 
In the 1870s numerous new dike organizations were founded, once again trig-
gered of by a storm tide in 1872 (PETERSEN/ ROHDE 1991, p. 150). Never-
theless, the modern nation-state was about to take over. Between 1900 and 
1940 the so called Anwachsrecht (the right to possess newly gained land) be-
came nationalized almost everywhere.  
There is an obvious connection between nationalization of dike properties 
and the technical development of dike construction and maintenance. With 
heavy equipment technical possibilities improved. Today, dikes are constructed 
up to 9 meters high. The financial demands of modernized dike construction in 
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries increasingly exceeded the capacities of 
dike associations that used to own dike properties well into the 1960s. After the 
flood of 1962 no less than a total of 99.5 kilometres of protecting dikes and 
high tide walls were newly built or extended. Costs were borne by the city of 
Hamburg and the central government of West Germany. The dike associations 
that would keep some responsibilities for the maintenance of dikes until 1977 
were unable to pay the expenses. The situation in Lower Saxony and 
Schleswig-Holstein was similar. However, in 1962 the nationalization of dike 
properties had been a decision of central and federal legislators taken some 
years before the flood occurred.  
Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that, over the centuries, storm 
tides have influenced processes such as technical development, social differen-
tiation, professionalization and nationalization in the German North Sea re-
gions. All these processes seem to have been intermingled: New technical 
equipment strengthened early entrepreneurship of professional dike construc-
tors; central powers could use these expert groups as tools when struggling to 
increase their political influence against local forces etc. While in the Middle 
Ages storm tides furthered private initiative to take the risk of living in a region 
of natural hazard, after 1500 they seem to have offered windows of opportunity 
for new expert groups, entrepreneurship and central powers to gain influence.  
Up to this point, the story of nationalized dike systems seems to be one of 
success in terms of efficient protection. Yet, the last fifty years must be put into 
perspective. The post-World War II-era was a period of massive economic 
growth and prosperity in West Germany, which enabled the state to enlarge 
state property and investment based on public revenue. At the same time, cli-
matic conditions in Central Europe were favourable for most part of the second 
half of the twentieth century. Over the last two decades, both these trends have 
changed. The German welfare state has been manoeuvred into structural eco-
nomic stagnation by political mismanagement. Enormous amounts of public 
investment capacities are spent for unemployment benefits and public debt 
interest each year. It may well be that budgetary gaps on all levels (from the 
communes up to the federal state) will lead to failure on various fields that 
previously have been defined as state responsibilities. At one point, this may 
also affect the modernization of dike systems and, thus, increase the vulnerabil-
ity of the North Sea Coast. The river dike system has already revealed its 
weaknesses during an increasing number of damaging floods in the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s (e.g. Odra 1997, Elbe 2002). As these events and recent 
storms show, climatic conditions have been less favourable over the last two 
decades. For dikes at the North Sea, the melting of polar ice through global 
warming, which may raise the sea level considerably, is the greatest threat. It 
is, therefore, too bold to conclude that the modern nation state has proved a 
more efficient protector of the coast than private property owners. It is obvi-
ously dubious to compare fifty (or, at maximum, a hundred) years of relative 
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success with a thousand years of ups and downs in the struggle for protection. 
What has definitely changed is the political framework in which the equilib-
rium between the demand for protection and the minimization in costs for 
modernization will be negotiated. As the case of New Orleans 2005 has proved, 
there is no guarantee that a modern democratic civil society will succeed in 
replacing its outdated dikes in time—before disaster strikes. 
References 
ALEXANDER, David (1997): The Study of Natural Disasters, 1977-97. Some 
Reflections on a Changing Field of Knowledge, in: Disasters 21, p. 284-304. 
ALLEMEYER, Marie Luisa (2006): „Kein Land ohne Deich...!“ Lebenswelten 
einer Küstengesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen (Veröffentlichungen 
des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, Bd. 222). 
BANKOFF, Greg (2003): Cultures of disaster. Society and natural hazards in the 
Philippines, New York. 
BANKOFF, Greg (2008): Cultures of disaster, cultures of coping: Hazard as a 
frequent life experience in the Philippines, 1600-2000, in: MAUCH, Christoph/ 
PFISTER, Christian (ed.): Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: A World His-
tory, Lanham, Md. (forthcoming). 
BECK, Ulrich (1992): Risk society : towards a new modernity, London/ Newbury 
Park. 
BORST, Arno (1981): Das Erdbeben von 1348. Ein historischer Beitrag zur Kata-
strophenforschung, in: Historische Zeitschrift 233, p. 529-568. 
BREIDERT, Wolfgang (1994): Die Erschütterung der vollkommenen Welt. Die 
Wirkung des Erdbebens von Lissabon im Spiegel europäischer Zeitgenossen, 
Darmstadt. 
CARR, Lowell Juilliard (1932): Disasters and the sequence-pattern concept of 
social change, in: American Journal of Sociology 38, p. 207-218. 
DE KRAKER, Adriaan M.J. (2000): Storm surges, high tides and storms as extreme 
weather events, their impact on the coastal zone of the North Sea and the human 
response, 1350 to 2000, in: Prace Geograficzne 107, p. 85-99. 
DOMBROWSKY, Wolf R. (1998): Again and again. Is a disaster what we call a 
“disaster”?, in: QUARANTELLI, Enrico Louis (ed.): What is a disaster. Perspec-
tives on the question, London/ New York, p. 19-30. 
FISCHER, Norbert (2003): Wassersnot und Marschengesellschaft. Zur Geschichte 
der Deiche in Kehdingen, Stade. 
GIERKE, Julius von (1901/1917): Die Geschichte des deutschen Deichrechts, 
Breslau (Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte). 
GROH, Dieter/ KEMPE, Michael/ MAUELSHAGEN, Franz (ed.): Naturkatastro-
phen. Beiträge zu ihrer Deutung, Wahrnehmung und Darstellung in Text und 
Bild von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, Tübingen (Literatur und Anthro-
pologie, 13). 
HEWITT, Kenneth (1997): Regions of risk: A geographical introduction to disas-
ters, Harlow (Themes in resource management). 
 143
HINRICHS, Boy et al. (1985): Flutkatastrophe 1634. Natur – Geschichte – Dich-
tung (Marcus Petersen zum 75. Geburtstag am 17. April 1985), Neumünster. 
JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN, Manfred (1992): Sturmflut 1717. Die Bewältigung 
einer Naturkatastrophe in der frühen Neuzeit, München. 
JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN, Manfred (2003): Gotteszorn und Meereswüten. Deu-
tungen von Sturmfluten vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert, in: GROH, Dieter/ KEMPE, 
Michael/ MAUELSHAGEN, Franz (ed.): Naturkatastrophen. Beiträge zu ihrer 
Deutung, Wahrnehmung und Darstellung in Text und Bild von der Antike bis ins 
20. Jahrhundert, Tübingen, p. 101-118. 
JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN, Manfred/ LEHMANN, Hartmut (ed.): Um Himmels 
Willen. Religion in Katastrophenzeiten, Göttingen. 
JANKRIFT, Kay Peter (2003): Brände, Stürme, Hungersnöte. Katastrophen in der 
mittelalterlichen Lebenswelt, Ostfildern. 
KEMPE, Michael/ ROHR, Christian (2003): Introduction, in: Environment and 
History 9 (Special Issue: Coping with the Unexpected – Natural Disasters and 
their Perception), p. 123-125. 
KREPS, Gary A. (1998): Disasters as systemic event and social catalyst, in: 
QUARANTELLI, Enrico Louis (ed.): What is a disaster. Perspectives on the 
question, London/ New York, p. 31-55. 
KÜHN, Hans Joachim (1992): Die Anfänge des Deichbaus in Schleswig-Holstein, 
Heide. 
LÖFFLER, Ulrich (1999): Lissabons Fall – Europas Schrecken. Die Deutung des 
Erdbebens von Lissabon im deutschsprachigen Protestantismus des 18. Jahrhun-
derts, Berlin etc. 
MAUELSHAGEN, Franz (2008): Disaster and Political Culture in Germany (Since 
1500), in: MAUCH, Christoph/ PFISTER, Christian (ed.): Natural Disasters, Cul-
tural Responses: A World History, Lanham, Md. (forthcoming). 
OLIVER-SMITH, Anthony (2002): Theorizing Disasters: Nature, Power, and Cul-
ture, in: HOFFMANN, Susanna/ OLIVER-SMITH, Anthony (ed.): Catastrophe 
& culture: The anthropology of disaster, Santa Fe, NM/ Oxford, p. 12-47. 
PANTEN, Albert et al. (1984): „Die erschreckliche Wasser-Fluth“ 1634: Die Flut 
vom 11. Oktober 1634 und ihre Folgen nach zeitgenössichen Berichten und Do-
kumenten mit einer Darstellung über den Einfluss der Sturmfluten auf die histori-
sche Entwicklung des nordfriesischen Küstenraumes, Husum. 
PAPPENHEIM, Max (1926): Die Siebenhardenbeliebung vom 17. Juni 1426. Fest-
schrift zur Fünfhundertjahrfeier auf Veranlassung des Vorbereitenden Ausschus-
ses, Flensburg. 
PETERSEN, Marcus/ ROHDE, Hans (1991): Sturmflut. Die grossen Fluten an den 
Küsten Schleswig-Holsteins und in der Elbe, Neumünster. 
POLIWODA, Guido (2007): Aus Katastrophen lernen. Sachsen im Kampf gegen 
die Fluten der Elbe, 1784 bis 1845, Köln/ Weimar/ Wien. 
ROHR, Christian (2003): Man and Natural Disaster in Late Medieval Austria. The 
Earthquake in Carinthia and Northern Italy on 25 January 1348 and its Percep-
tion, in: Environment & History 9, p. 127-149. 
SCHAMA, Simon (1987): The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch 
culture in the Golden Age, New York. 
SCHOTT, Dieter (2002): One City – Three Catastrophes: Hamburg from the Great 
Fire 1842 to the Great Flood 1962, in: MASSARD-GUILBAUD, Geneviève/ 
 144
PLATT, Harold L./ SCHOTT, Dieter (ed.): Cities and catastrophes: Coping with 
emergency in European history = Villes et catastrophes: réactions face à 
l’urgence dans l’histoire européenne, Frankfurt am Main/ New York, p. 185-204. 
TAYLOR, Alan (1999): “The Hungry Year”: 1789 on the Northern Border of 
Revolutionary America, in: JOHNS, Alessa (ed.): Dreadful Visitations. Confront-
ing Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment, New York/ London, 
p. 145-181. 
TORRENCE, Robin/ GRATTAN, John (ed.): Natural disasters and cultural change, 
London/ New York (One world archaeology, 45). 
VOSS, Martin (2006): Symbolische Formen. Grundlagen und Elemente einer So-
ziologie der Katastrophe, Bielefeld. 
WOEBCKEN, Carl (1924): Deiche und Sturmfluten der deutschen Nordseeküste, 
Wilhelmshaven. 
